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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STAE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v, : 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, : Case No. 20041095-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
POINT I. MR. ANDERSON'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING ARGUMENT 
WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED WHERE THE ISSUE WAS RAISED AND 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE ISSUE. 
Utah case law establishes that the doctrine of waiver only "has application if 
defendants fail to raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the judge has an 
opportunity to rule on the issue." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,1J9, 46 P.3d 230, 232. Two 
policy reasons exist for the preservation rule, first, the rule "give[s] the trial court an 
opportunity to 'address the claimed error, and if appropriate correct it,5 and second, . . . 'a 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 
enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . . 
claiming on appeal the Court should reverse." Id. at [^10 (citation omitted). The second 
policy reason does not have application in this case where Mr. Anderson had already 
been convicted and only challenges the trial court's imposition of his sentences as 
consecutive for the first time at the order to show cause hearing. R. 55:19, Furthermore, 
there is no strategic reason for failing to mention something that would assist the trial 
court in ensuring the defendant received the lower sentence for which he was arguing. 
In this case, Mr. Anderson brought to the trial court's attention that it could only 
impose the original prison term ordered. R. 55:19. Mr. Anderson stated: 
Judge, I believe Judge Atherton sentenced him on these other charges 
concurrently and that took place after the sentencing with regard to these 
particular cases. So it would be our position - 1 don't know if it was ever, 
what the sentence was in the first place if you ordered it consecutive or not 
but if you ordered it concurrent than it would be our position that that [sic] 
concurrent sentencing would rule the day. 
R. 55:18-19. 
The trial court then specifically ruled that based on the "kinds of charges that [Mr. 
Anderson] admitted committing] while on probation it seems that it would be just in my 
judgment to run them consecutively, run this charge consecutively with the others. The 
others are serious violent charges apparently involving firearms, so I'll impose this to run 
consecutively." R. 55:19. 
Furthermore, under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e) this Court has 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Anderson's challenge of his consecutive sentences. Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (e) allows this Court to correct an illegal sentence or one 
that is imposed in an illegal manner "at any time," which means this Court is permitted to 
consider the legality of Mr. Anderson's sentence regardless of whether he properly 
preserved the issue below. Utah R. Crim. P. 22 (e); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
K28n.ll,31P.3d615. 
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In addition, Judge Reese did not have jurisdiction to order the original sentence 
consecutive. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)("[o]nce a 
court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."). "It is 
well-settled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or 
the court." State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 60, ^ 4, 65 P.3d 1191,1191 (citing State v. 
Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992)). "Subject matter jurisdiction ccan neither be 
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the jurisdiction of the court 
over the subject matter may be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to 
make such an objection is never waived.'" State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^ 5, 97 
P.3d 732, 736 (quoting James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to review Mr. Anderson's challenge to the 
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences after it failed to designate such terms in 
the final written order of judgment in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights 
against double jeopardy and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT, WITHOUT JURISDICTION, INCREASED 
MR. ANDERSON'S SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN IT 
ORDERED THAT HIS ORIGINAL SENTENCE RUN CONSECUTIVE TO 
LATER CONVICTIONS UPON PROBATION REVOCATION. 
Contrary to the state's argument, when the trial court revoked Mr. Anderson's 
probation and imposed the original sentence to run consecutively to new convictions 
entered after the original sentence was entered in this case, it effectively increased his 
sentence. See Appellee's Brief at 8. The order that the original sentence run 
consecutively with newly acquired sentences was an increase in sentence because: (a) the 
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trial court that revoked probation did not have jurisdiction to order the original sentence 
to run consecutively, but only had the statutory authority to impose the original sentence, 
and; (b) Judge Atherton who had the statutory authority to impose consecutive or 
concurrent sentences implemented a concurrent sentencing scheme; thus by imposing a 
consecutive sentence, Judge Reese thereby increased the length of the sentence contrary 
to the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT THAT REVOKED PROBATION DID NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE TO RUN 
CONSECUTIVELY, RATHER IT ONLY HAD THE STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE. 
Defendant does not assert that Judge Noel originally imposed concurrent sentencing, 
rather Mr. Anderson asserts that Judge Noel was without statutory authority to order the 
original sentence as concurrent or consecutive because Mr. Anderson did not have any 
other sentences on the date the original sentence was imposed. See Appellee's Brief at 
10. Moreover, once probation is revoked, the trial court only has the statutory authority 
to impose that original sentence and is without jurisdiction to order that original sentence 
consecutive or concurrent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)(2003). This statute 
provides: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
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Id. Judge Noel did not have the authority to use the provisions of this statute because at 
the time the original sentence was imposed, this statute was inapplicable. 
Additionally Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(a) provides that: 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). This rule further illustrates that there is a set time for sentencing 
after a conviction mandated at "not less than two nor more than 45 days." Id. Judge 
Noel complied with this rule, but Judge Reese did not have the jurisdiction to modify 
that sentence much later than the rule mandates for the original sentence to be imposed. 
As the state has acknowledged and argued before this Court, "once a court imposes a 
valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."1 State v. Montoya, 825 
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is not authorized thereafter to amend the 
1
 The state does not argue in its response that Judge Reese had the jurisdiction to modify 
the sentence, but rather argues that by ordering the original sentence consecutive to later 
sentences, Judge Reese was not increasing the sentence. This is critical as the state has 
acknowledged that any reduction or increase after the original sentence has been entered 
is beyond the trial court's jurisdiction. See Appellee's Brief at 8-14, State v. Slater, Case 
No. 20050012-C A at Addendum A. In Slater, the state argues that a trial court is without 
jurisdiction to reduce a sentence upon probation revocation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-402. Decision was rendered for this case in an unpublished opinion. See State v. 
Slater, 2005 UT App 457 (memorandum decision). Like the argument advanced by the 
state in Slater, Judge Reese is similarly without jurisdiction to alter a sentence previously 
imposed. It is appropriate that the state has not argued that Judge Reese had jurisdiction 
to modify the original sentence because it has long been recognized by Utah courts that 
prosecutors, unlike private attorneys, represent the sovereign and it is imperative that they 
advance a uniform interpretation of the law in order to ensure that justice is done. See 
generally State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2001). 
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sentence unless the sentence is illegal or imposed in an illegal manner. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time."). Pursuant to Utah's statutory scheme, once probation is 
revoked, the trial court is granted the authority to sentence only in the narrowly defined 
circumstances where the defendant has not previously been sentenced, or to execute the 
sentence previously imposed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii)(2003). 
In this case, a definite sentence had already been imposed, thus the trial court's 
jurisdiction was limited to executing that previously imposed sentence. Utah's statutory 
framework does not give the trial court jurisdiction to determine whether the previously 
imposed sentence should be ordered to run consecutively or concurrently. The trial court 
is limited to merely executing the original sentence. "Where the statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, [Utah courts] do not look beyond the language's plain meaning 
to divine legislative intent." State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, \ 10, 14 P.3d 129 
(quoting State v. Tryba, 2000 UT App 230,113, 8 P.3d 274, 278.). "Thus, [Utah courts] 
will interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of 
the statute." Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1996). "Unambiguous 
language in the statute . . . may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Zoll 
& Branch, P.C.v.Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added). 
Likewise Utah courts assume that the Legislature has worded statutes 
intentionally and include or exclude things purposely. "The fact that the legislature 
plainly articulated a plaintiffs required state of mind but was silent as to whether the 
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plaintiff must have relied on the untruth or omission to recover clearly indicates that the 
legislature did not intend to adopt a reliance requirement." Wood, 919 P.2d at 563. 
Utah courts will not supplement or add to what the legislature has clearly expressed, but 
instead assumes the legislature "to have used the involved terms advisedly and could 
easily have incorporated language allowing" the trial court statutory power to modify an 
original sentence upon probation revocation, but it did not. Deland v. Uintah County, 
945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When language is plain on its face, the court 
will strictly give effect to that language and there is no discretion to change such 
language to be more or less inclusive. See King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 
1281, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, because the legislature clearly stated a 
trial court only had the authority to sentence a defendant if no sentence was previously 
imposed or execute the original sentence, it did not give trial courts the authority to alter 
an original sentence and order it to run consecutively when such an order could not have 
been part of the original sentence. 
Judge Atherton was the only judge who had jurisdiction and statutory authority to 
order the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively in this case as when she 
implemented sentence, Mr. Anderson had more than just one sentence. Judge Atherton 
appropriately considered all the required factors and ordered a concurrent sentencing 
scheme. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 13. Courts have held that when a sentencing 
court orders sentences to be served concurrently, the defendant is "technically serving 
more than one sentence, as a practical matter he is serving only one." Carlin v. Commsr. 
Of Correction, 243 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Mass. 1969). Thus, when a judge "orders 
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sentences to be served concurrently, this order creates a sentencing scheme that 
establishes a relationship between, or among the sentences. The concurrency order thus 
becomes part of the sentences themselves." Commonwealth v. Bruzzeze, 773 NJE.2d 
921, 926 (Mass. 2002). "Concurrent sentences are sentences that operate 
simultaneously" State v. Martinez, 656 P.2d 911,912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). "When a 
sentence is changed from concurrent to consecutive, it is increased in length" Maryland 
v. Sayre, 552 A.2d 553, 562 (Md. 1989). In this case, when Judge Noel changed Judge 
Atherton's sentencing scheme from concurrent to consecutive, he effectively increased 
the length of time Mr. Anderson was required to serve. 
The court in Martinez enunciated that increasing concurrent sentences to 
consecutive because of a revocation of probation is an "increase in penalty and violates 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy" Martinez, 656 P.2d at 913 
(citations omitted). Likewise, in our case, because Mr. Anderson was already sentenced 
to a concurrent sentencing scheme by the only judge with the jurisdiction and statutory 
authority to consider whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, when 
Judge Noel implemented the original sentence and then altered that sentence by ordering 
it to be consecutively served, it resulted in an increase in penalty which violates the 
prohibition against double jeopardy. 
Moreover, when Utah courts analyze whether a sentence is increased or more 
severe than an original or first sentence, they hold that "[t]he second sentence cannot 
exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their 
magnitude." State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981)(internal citation 
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omitted). "This means that no new element of sentence can be added and that no new 
element can be augmented in magnitude." Id. The consecutive order is an additional 
element to the original sentence that could not have anticipated a consecutive order 
because at the time of sentencing, there was only one sentence. Thus, under Utah's 
statutory scheme and court rules, when Judge Reese ordered the original sentence to run 
consecutive to later sentences ordered concurrent, he increased the original sentence 
thereby violating the prohibition against double jeopardy. 
B. OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT ALLOW FOR UPWARD 
MODIFICATIONS OR MODIFICATIONS TO ORIGINAL SENTENCE 
AFTER PROBATION REVOCATION ARE CONTROLLED BY 
STATUTES CONTRARY TO OR DISTINCT FROM THE UTAH 
STATUTE. 
The cases upon which the state relies to show that other jurisdictions have allowed for 
modifications of the original sentence upon probation revocation are irrelevant to this 
analysis because: (a) none of these cases have binding precedent upon this court, but 
more importantly; (b) these jurisdictions are controlled by statutes that explicitly allow 
for modifications to the original sentence upon probation revocation, contrary to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii)(2003). 
The state cites to United States v. Olivarez-Martinez for the proposition that a court 
can order an original sentence consecutive to intervening sentences upon probation 
revocation. Brief of Appellee at 12-13 (citing United States v. Olivarez-Martinez, 767 
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1985)). The holding in Olivarez-Martinez is that a district court can 
implement a sentence consecutive to a federal sentence upon probation revocation. 767 
9 
F.2d at 1137. However, in that case, where the sentence has been suspended during 
probation, the federal statute allowed for implementation of the original sentence or any 
lesser sentence. Id. In Olivarez-Martinez, the trial court decreased incarceration time 
from 54 months to 46 months in addition to ordering the sentence to run consecutive with 
an intervening federal sentence. Id. First, this decision is not binding on this Court. 
Second, Olivarez-Martinez is analyzing a federal statutory framework separate and 
distinct from the relevant Utah statutes under consideration in this case. By contrast, in 
State v. Slater, the defendant argued that he should be able to reduce his conviction after 
probation revocation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003). 2005 UT App 457 
(memorandum decision); Case No. 20050012-CA. Similarly, the federal statutory 
framework in Olivarez-Martinez grants the trial court discretion in applying a reduced 
sentence upon probation revocation. Olivarez-Martinez, 767 F.2d at 1137. However, the 
state argued in Slater that the trial court was without jurisdiction under Utah rule to alter a 
sentence already imposed in order to allow for a reduced sentence. See Addendum A. 
Although the court allows for such a reduction under the federal statute in Olivarez-
Martinez, this same action may be prohibited under the Utah statute. This is illustrative of 
the important statutory differences between the relevant Utah statutory framework and 
the federal statutory framework under consideration in Olivarez-Martinez. 
Similarly, the state cites to State v. Holcomb for this proposition. Brief of Appellee at 
14 (citing State v. Holcomb, 360 S.E.2d 232 (W.Va. 1987)). However, in Holcomb, 
unlike in Mr, Anderson's case, the trial court was not executing an original sentence. 
Instead, the trial court was sentencing the defendant in Holcomb for the first time since 
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probation revocation. Holcomb, 360 S.e.2d at 235. Accordingly, West Virginia law 
allows for the trial judge to impose sentence for the first time, rather than being restricted 
to implementing the original sentence. See W. Va. Code § 62-12-10 (2005). 
Likewise, in Williams v. Wainwright the statute under which the defendant was 
sentenced after probation revocation clearly provides "[t]he court. . .shall.. . impose any 
sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on 
probation." Wainwright, 493 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D. Fla. 1980)(quoting Fla. Stat. § 
948.06(1)). Compare this statutory language with Utah's statute which provides: 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii)-(iii)(2003). 
The statute relied on in State v. Jones similarly allowed for the trial court to 
implement any sentence that could have originally been imposed. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 
782, 786 (N.D. 1988)(quoting N.D. Stat. § 12.1-32-07(4)). Thus, the court stated "[t]his 
includes a sentence which is more severe than the sentence originally imposed. Therefore 
Jones should have expected that a violation of the conditions of his probation could result 
in a harsher sentence." Id. at 786. This expectation that the North Dakota statutory 
framework gave the defendant placed him on notice that his sentence was not considered 
final, thus this is the reason double jeopardy was not implicated. The statutory 
framework in State v. Perkins also allows a trial court to impose a fine if one has not 
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previously been imposed and impose any sentence it could have originally imposed. 
Perkins, 435 A.2d 504 (N.H. 1981)( citing N.H. Rev. Stat. § 651:2(VII)). The statute 
relied on in Smith v. State also allowed for the trial court, upon probation revocation, to 
"'revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and may impose any sentence which 
might originally have been imposed.'" Smith v. State, 307 N.E.2d 281, 281-2 (Ind. 
1974)(quoting Ind. Code, Ann. § 9-2211). Finally, the statute relied on in State v. Payne 
also allowed for resentencing to any term which might have originally been imposed. 
Payne, 455 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 1981) 
There is no language in the Utah statute which would give the sentencing court the 
power to reconsider the sentence and impose any sentence that it originally could have 
imposed at the time of sentencing if a sentence had already been imposed. Accord 
Wood, 919 P.2d at 563 ("The fact that the legislature plainly articulated a plaintiffs 
required state of mind but was silent as to whether the plaintiff must have relied on the 
untruth or omission to recover clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to adopt 
a reliance requirement."). Double jeopardy implicates a defendant's expectation in the 
finality of his or her sentence. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 193-94 
(1873). When a state statute is crafted in such a manner to clearly place a defendant on 
notice that if she violates probation, the terms of her original sentence may be modified, 
then she has no expectation of finality in her sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court 
analyzing a double jeopardy claim under a statute that allows for modification of the 
original sentence commented: "[t]hus [defendant] should have expected that a violation 
of the conditions of his probation could result in a harsher sentence." Jones, 418 N.W.2d 
12 
at 785. However, the Utah statute does not allow for such modification and thus a 
defendant who has been issued a suspended sentence has an expectation in the finality of 
that sentence upon probation revocation. Thus, double jeopardy is implicated in the 
instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. 
Anderson respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's imposition of his 
original sentence as consecutive to the aggravated robbery convictions he is serving in 
another case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) V ^ day of January, 2006. 
^ ^ L i ^ k ^ ^ 
Josie EjBrumfield 
Debra M. Nelson 
C. Bevan Corry 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL HIS 
CONVICTION 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for a section 402 reduction in his sentence. Br. App. at 12-16. Specifically, 
he asserts that the trial court failed to "consider the circumstances of the offense and 
[defendant's] character and history before denying his motion." Br. App. at 15. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's claim because the claim 
concerns defendant's conviction and sentence, which he did not appeal. 
A. Defendant's appeal is limited to review of the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. 
Generally, a defendant who desires to appeal his conviction and sentence 
must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the final judgment. See 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a). The sentencing order is usually the final order that 
disposes of the case and starts the thirty-day window for appealing a conviction and 
sentence. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT100,14,57 P.3d 1065; State v. Walker, 2002 UT 
App 290,111, 55 P.3d 1165. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the 
appellate court of jurisdiction over the case. See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, % 5 (noting 
that thirty-day period for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be 
enlarged by court); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,37 (Utah 1981) (same). 
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Post-judgment orders by the trial court do not resurrect a defendant's right to 
appeal his underlying conviction and sentence, unless the order concerns a timely 
motion under rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, \ 17, 106 P.3d 729, that a 
restitution order entered several months after the final judgment was "not a new 
and final judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal 
conviction/7 Likewise, this Court has held that a revocation of a defendant's 
probation does not renew the time to appeal the original judgment. See State v. Love, 
2001 UT App 79, f 3 (unpublished memorandum decision), attached as Addendum 
B. 
Rather, appeals from non-rule 4(b) judgments are limited to review of that 
particular judgment. Appeals from post-judgment orders are permitted by statute if 
they concern an "order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The right to appeal a 
post-judgment order is distinct and separate, however, from a defendant's right to 
appeal a "final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) (West 2004). For example, an appeal from a post-judgment 
restitution order is limited to review only of the propriety of the restitution order. 
See Garner, 2005 UT 6,117. Similarly, an appeal from a probation revocation order, 
as in the instant case, is limited to examining the propriety of the probation 
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revocation, not the underlying conviction or sentence. Defendant may not use the 
revocation order to reach back in time and resurrect issues relating to his conviction 
and sentence. See Love, 2001 UT App 79,13 
Inasmuch as defendant appeals from a post-judgment order revoking his 
probation, this Court only has jurisdiction to consider the denial of his section 402 
motion if the trial court had jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing to 
entertain a section 402 motion. Cf. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah App. 
1991) (holding that since trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, 
appellate court had no jurisdiction to review resentencing). 
B. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reduce the degree of an 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) once it enters a 
valid final judgment. 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1), a court may only 
reduce the degree of the offense before it sentences the offender and enters a final 
judgment. The statute does not authorize the court to amend an offender's 
conviction and sentence after entry of the final judgment 
A court's authority to reduce the degree of an offense is statutory, and the 
scope and limits of that authority are thus a matter of statutory interpretation. 
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to 
the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the 
language is ambiguous/' Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,112,48 P.3d 949. 
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The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by 
the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/7 State 
v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25,4 P.3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language so as 
"'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful/" State v. Maestas, 2002 
UT 123,1 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 10, 44 P.3d 
680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if 
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute No clause[,] sentence 
or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction 
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute/" Id. 
at <[ 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th 
ed. 1984)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) states the following: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by 
statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.2 
2
 Subsection (2) of the statute provides alternative conditions for reducing a 
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. As defendant challenges his 
conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, subsection (2) does not 
apply. 
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Subsection (1) authorizes a court to reduce the classification of an offense by 
one degree if the court concludes that the statutory degree is too harsh in light of the 
offender's history and the circumstances of the crime. The last phrase in subsection 
(1) states that the court may reduce the level of the offense and then "impose 
sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(1). The direction to "impose 
sentence accordingly" suggests an intent by the legislature that courts only use 
subsection (1) to reduce a conviction before sentencing. That construction is 
consistent with this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's prior holdings regarding 
the jurisdiction of a trial court after sentencing. 
"Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, % 10,84 P.3d 854. It may not thereafter revisit the case to 
set aside or amend the sentence unless the sentence is illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time."); State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 16,84 P.3d 1193 (concluding 
that trial court had no jurisdiction to resentence Finlayson after remittitur of appea 
in which one of three convictions was reversed); State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, *| 
5 (unpublished memorandum decision) (explaining that once a court imposes < 
valid sentence, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to resentence thi 
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defendant, and the appellate court has no authority to review any purported 
resentencing), attached as Addendum C 3 
Construing subsection (1) to allow a court to reduce the classification of an 
offense after sentencing would open the door for offenders to seek reclassification 
and resentencing months or even years after the final judgment. Such an 
interpretation is inimical to the interests of finality in judicial proceedings, as well as 
against the plain language of the statute. It would put the final judgment in limbo 
leaving it forever open to possible reclassification and a new appeal based on the 
denial of the reclassification. As shown by the plain language of the statue, the 
legislature did not intend such a result. 
Permitting courts to reduce the degree of a conviction only before entry of the 
final order is also consistent with rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That 
rule states that motions to reduce a criminal offense must be filed at least ten days 
before sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2).4 
Courts may, however, revoke, modify, or extend probation within the 
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). Where a prison 
sentence has already been imposed but is suspended, revocation of probation is not 
resentencing, but rather, execution of an already imposed sentence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(iii) ("If the probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed"). 
4
 The rule was amended on April 1,2005, to permit parties to file a motion to 
reduce a third degree felony under section 402(2) anytime after sentencing. 
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Such a construction of subsection (1) is not only consistent with its plaii 
language and the rules and precedent of this Court, it is also good policy, i 
reduction under subsection (1) requires the court to consider "the nature am 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty/7 Utah Cod 
Ann. § 76-3-402(1). These are matters that the trial court must already consider i 
imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT12, \ 8,40 P.3d 626 (requiring tri< 
courts to consider all legally relevant factors in sentencing). They are also mattei 
that may be difficult to consider at a probation revocation hearing held months ( 
even years after the final judgment. This is particularly true in cases where tl 
defendant pleads guilty and there is little or no record of the details of the offens 
The State may lose track of victims and witnesses and may return or destrc 
exhibits, all of which could be necessary to consider "the nature and circumstanc 
of the offense/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). 
C. Because defendant raises no claim related to the revocation 
of his probation, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his 
appeal. 
Defendant's only claim before this Court is that the trial court erred 
denying his motion to reduce the degree of his offense. Br. Aplt. at 13-16. 
appeals, however, from the court's order revoking his probation, which occun 
more than a year after the final judgment (R. 102). He does not challenge the ba 
for the revocation. Although defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at 
probation revocation hearing, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a 
motion. See supra subpoint B. Inasmuch as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion 
and should dismiss the case. Cf. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 681 (holding that since trial 
court's lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, appellate court had no 
jurisdiction to review resentencing).5 
D. Even if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's claim is 
meritless. 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim is 
meritless. The Utah Supreme Court has treated motions to reduce the degree of an 
offense as a sentencing issue for which trial courts have wide discretion. See State v. 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985. This Court must afford the trial court "wide 
latitude and discretion in sentencing/7 State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 
1997). "[A] sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it 
is inherently unfair or clearly excessive/' Id. 
Defendant candidly acknowledges that "[t]here was evidence to support the 
trial court's sentence/7 Br. Aplt. at 14. He refers to the PSI, which categorized him 
5
 The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court. This Court 
may, however, affirm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. See State 
v. Cheure, 2000 UT App 6 , f12, 994 P.2d 1278. Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction 
may be raised at anytime. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679. 
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